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Recent studies on trade policy for low-income countries have established that 
high transport costs associated with poor quality infrastructure in countries 
such as Kenya represent a barrier to trade and an additional source of 
protection to domestic producers of import competing goods. This study 
reports results for Kenya on protection rates from tariffs and transport costs. 
Although Kenya reduced tariffs during the 1990s, protection increased for 
agriculture, manufactured foods, wood products and clothing. Two sectors 
experienced declines in protection (raw textiles, fishing and forestry) and 
chemicals moved from positive to negative protection. Effective protection 
due to transport costs was equivalent to 50% in the early 1990s but fell to 20% 
by 2003.  As the new EAC Customs Union implies a reduction in tariffs, 
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1 Introduction 
Kenya achieved an impressive growth record in the first decade after independence in 
the mid to late 1960s. However the growth momentum was not sustained in the 1970s. 
ROK (1975) attributed this slack to three factors, all external sector related: a price 
squeeze—in the international markets import prices were rising faster than export 
prices; a commodity squeeze—there was a rising trend in imports; and a credit 
squeeze—the difficulty of borrowing more from abroad.  The only solution identified 
was boosting export performance. 
 












  Source: Kenya Analytical Data Compendium (2002) 
 
The trend in Chart 1 indicates a steady decline in GDP growth from 1968 to 1974. 
The poor performance in 1974 is attributed to the oil shock -- the price of oil 
increased by 398%. There was a significant improvement in economic growth 
between 1976 –77, the coffee boom period recording a growth of 8.3%. However, 
after the boom an expansionary fiscal policy was adopted which complicated 
macroeconomic management in the medium term. This episode was followed by 
another sluggish growth performance between 1984-86 attributed to inter alia balance 
of payments problems and droughts.  During the period 1978 –1986, the policy 



















































































to more restrictive import control schedules - followed by relaxation once the 
situation improved, resulting in a complex structure of protection.  
 
Trade reforms in Kenya started in the early 1990s. The outward orientation strategy 
was characterized by trade and commercial policy reforms intended to introduce 
efficiency gains in the economy by eliminating distortions and ‘getting the prices 
right’ through a greater reliance on markets. Quantitative restrictions were replaced 
with tariffs; average tariffs were lowered and made more uniform. Trade policy 
reforms were complemented by liberalization of the exchange rate and additional 
export incentives also aimed at increasing external competitiveness.  
 
A decade later trade liberalization has not delivered the promise of high real growth 
rates, export performance has been sluggish, economic growth has witnessed a 
consistently declining trend since 1996. Population growth rates have been well above 
the growth rate of productive output, resulting in rising poverty and unemployment. 
During the recession period, population growth averaged 2.8% while economic 
growth averaged about 2.4%, the corollary is a gradual decline in incomes per capita. 
In terms of contribution to national output, agriculture maintains the lead accounting 
for 24% of GDP, the manufacturing sector has not matured to emerge as the principle 
export sector as was initially envisaged under the infant industry thesis. 
 
This study seeks to analyse the post liberalisation structure of protection in Kenya, 
from 1990 to 2000. Effective Protection Coefficients (EPCs) will be computed at 
industry/activity level and ranked to determine the direction of resource pulls in 
production. The EPCs will be used to compare the rates of protection across industries 
and across time to uncover the impact of trade liberalisation on the structure of 
protection in Kenya.  Further, the study will analyse the structure of protection arising 
from transport costs as a natural barrier to trade. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows; section two is background covering 
trade performance and policy regimes in Kenya. Effective rates of protection from 
tariffs are computed and discussed in section three. Protection and taxation arising 
from international freight costs and domestic transport costs are covered in section 
four. The summary and conclusions are covered in section five.   -5-
2  The Trade Regimes in Kenya  
The poor performance of the external sector has been the motivation behind several 
liberalisation episodes in Kenya, see Reinikka (1994), Maxwell Stamp Associates 
(1989), Glenday and Ndii (2003).  Though there is no consensus on the exact timing 
of the liberalisation episodes, the periodic increase in imports of goods and services 
(numbered 1-8 in Chart 2) coincide with the suggested episodes. Reinikka (1994), for 
instance, identifies five episodes. The first was in 1973 following the oil shock, a 
398% increase in the price of oil leaving the country in a severe foreign exchange 
crunch, but was not sustainable - exchange controls had to be tightened to conserve 
foreign exchange, reversing the measures instituted. The second episode followed the 
coffee boom 1976-77; the higher earnings from coffee relaxed the foreign exchange 
constraint, permitting a relaxation of import restrictions.  
 
 





























































































Source: KIPPRA Data Compendium 
 
The period between the first and second liberalisation episodes was characterized by 
persistent balance of payments deficits, largely due to the massive increase in the cost 
of oil imports. By 1979, 120% of coffee export earnings were required to pay for oil 
imports, (ROK 1980). During the same period the plan to achieve an 8% increase in 
the growth of exports was not realizable, and there was a fall in the price of   -6-
agricultural commodities in the international market. Furthermore, as a result of the 
break up of the East African Community (EAC) in 1977,  Kenya lost the Tanzanian 
market which was an important destination for her exports.  
 
The third liberalisation episode was motivated by the need to correct macroeconomic 
imbalances, the aftermath of the expansionary fiscal policy, which followed the coffee 
boom. Between the three liberalisation episodes, the BOP deficit increased and each 
crisis would be addressed through ad hoc quantitive restrictions in addition to the 
existing tariffs. Export performance deteriorated and the need to remove the anti-
export bias in the trade policy regime became the overriding concern which was 
addressed through the import substitution strategy.   
 
The stated policies under the IS strategy were to contain the growth of imports to less 
than 2% on an annual basis, down from 7.3%; increase the growth of exports to 8% 
per annum and stimulate domestic production in substitution for imports and to 
support exports. Imports were to be constrained through higher taxes and quantitative 
restrictions, whilst an export subsidy of 10% on manufactured goods would promote 
exports. A foreign exchange allocation committee was constituted and an export-
import licensing office to manage the controls aimed at increasing exports. A complex 
structure of protection emerged and the quantitative restrictions created a fertile 
environment for rent-seeking activities.  
  
Though the controls reduced the volume and value of imports from 39% of GDP in 
1980 to 28% in 1984, reducing the deficit, trade performance deteriorated. Import 
controls constrained the growth of manufacturing and exports remained around 25% 
of GDP. When the IS strategy was adopted during the second half of 1980s, GDP 
growth ranged between 4-6% but the strategy was unsustainable. The growth of 
manufacturing was based on domestic demand and the scope for growth under IS was 
limited. Following the failure of IS strategy, Kenya started implementing a gradual 
liberalisation programme in 1986, with specific focus of eliminating anti export bias. 
 
The tariff rationalisation programme started in 1986 with policy pronouncements in 
ROK (1986) and the National Development Plans. Trade policy reforms comprised of 
three components: rationalize the tariff code, reduce the average tariff rates and   -7-
reduce the number of tariff bands (Pritchett and Sethi, 1994). Kenya has been 
undertaking trade reforms since the early 1990s, as part of World Bank conditionality 
and in preferential trade arrangements. Starting from 1990 there has been a gradual 
reduction in both tariff rates, especially on imported intermediate inputs, and tariff 
bands. The magnitude of reduction is constrained by revenue loss implications and the 
gradual pace allows for shifting to other sources of revenue. 
 
Duty rates on imported raw materials and spare parts were targeted for reduction so as 
to reduce the anti-export bias and improve the country’s competitiveness.  Duty rates 
for this category of goods ranged between 10% and 100% in 1990 — the first steps in 
the liberalisation process were to reduce tariffs on intermediate inputs by an average 
of 5%, while increasing duty on finished products by a maximum of 35%. Duty on 
capital equipment and parts has also been targeted for reduction in the liberalisation 
process, and items taxed at 3% and 5% were zero rated by 2003. A similar reduction 
was applied to raw materials that are not produced locally.  The other liberalisation 
measure has been the reduction in the number of tariff bands.  Starting from 1989, the 
number of tariff categories was reduced from 25 to 17; in 1990 another five categories 
were eliminated, reducing the bands to 12, and to 9 by 1993. Currently there are five 
tariff bands: free, 5%, 15%, 25% and 35%.  
 
In the liberalisation process, 1993 presented specific challenges, and there was a 25% 
temporary increase in duty rates. This was occasioned by the high inflationary 
pressure in the domestic markets and the mopping up exercise significantly increased 
domestic interest payments, additional revenues had to be mobilised through tariff 
revenue to cover the additional expenditure. With the exception of specific 
agricultural commodities, notably sugar, the tariff liberalisation has resulted in a 
significant reduction in tariff barriers. However, there have been notable policy 
reversals; duty on fabrics was raised from 25% to 35%, to protect local producers, 
duty on locally available food stuffs was raised to 35% while the duty on sugar 
increased to 100%. The duty rates applied on wheat and sugar imports from 
COMESA caused a trade dispute with trading partners. The IMF rates the Kenyan 
trade regime at 6 on a scale of 1 to 10 (most restrictive), a moderately restrictive trade 
policy (IMF 2003).  
   -8-
 
Export Performance 
A review of export performance indicates that there are only two episodes when 
Kenya recorded a balance of payments surplus (Chart 2).  The first was during the 
coffee boom in 1977, the second in 1993-94 due to a combination of a weak shilling, 
abolition of exchange controls and a fall in the real wage (Glenday and Ndii 2000). 
The high level of export growth was not sustained and explicit measures were taken to 
revamp export performance - duty/VAT remission, an Export Promotion Programmes 
Office, Export Processing Zones (EPZ) and Manufacturing Under Bond (MUB). In 
addition, regional trade agreements under COMESA and EAC are also intended to 
enhance export performance. Other institutional arrangements were also put in place 
to promote exports. The Export Promotion Council (EPC), was established to identify 
export opportunities, putting in place a system for overcoming bottlenecks to export 
growth. The Department of External Trade (DET) developed projects and schemes for 
export promotion. 
 
According to Glenday and Ndii (2003), exports from MUB/EPZ account for a meagre 
1% of total exports. Some of the problems cited for the poor performance of the 
facilities include the loss of competitiveness arising from an increase in the real wage 
rate and the exchange rate appreciation. The other constraint to the growth of these 
schemes is the treatment within a Preferential Trade Area, (PTA); goods from these 
schemes do not benefit from the preferential tariffs within a trade block, they are 
taxed at “the rest of the world” rates which is major constraint since COMESA and 
EAC are the main destinations for Kenyan exports (Glenday and Ryan 2003).   
 
Chart 3 shows that the share of manufacturing in total exports has remained stable, 
averaging 22% of total exports except in 1993-94 when it increased to 31%. 
Agriculture continues to be the principle export sector, although agriculture itself has 
not done well. Indeed,  excluding coffee and tea, all other exports as a share of GDP 
fell from 14% in 1962-71 and 13 % in 1972-80 to 8% in1981-92, but recovered to 
13% in 1993-98. By 2002, coffee, tea and horticulture accounted for 53% of total 
export earnings despite the price decline in the international markets for primary 
commodities (especially coffee).   -9-
 
 














Source: Statistical Abstract Various Issues 
 
Africa continues to be the dominant export market for Kenyan goods, accounting for 
49% of total exports in 2002, followed by Western Europe and Asia each accounting 
for 28% and 15% respectively.  Of the 49% share destined for the African market, 
55% is accounted for by Uganda and Tanzania. Europe is the major source of imports, 
accounting for 34% of total imports. Africa, primarily COMESA and EAC, accounts 
for only 11% of total Kenyan imports. Regional integration could benefit Kenya as it 
is a major regional supplier, although suggested Common External Tariff (CET) rates 
are often below current Kenyan tariffs. For the COMESA region, the proposed CET 
rates are 0, 5, 15 and 25% for capital goods, raw materials, intermediate goods and 
final goods respectively.  Under the EAC Customs Union, goods from Uganda and 
Tanzania are to be imported into Kenya duty free.  The EAC protocol established a 
three band CET: 0% for raw materials 10 % for intermediate goods and 25% for all 
finished goods. Once the CET became effective in 2006, Kenya’s top rate was 
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3   ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA 
The structure of protection can be analysed using partial equilibrium or computable 
general equilibrium approaches. The former is more common and includes measures 
such as nominal rate of protection, (NRP), effective rate of protection, (ERP), Trade 
Restrictiveness Index (TRI) and the index of implied import restrictiveness (IIIR). 
The ERP represents the percentage increase in value added per unit in economic 
activity permitted by the tariff structure, holding the exchange rate constant. It can be 
defined as the ratio of domestic to world value added, relative to a non-interventionist 
trade regime, (Corden 1966; Anderson 1996; Conway and Bale 1988). While nominal 
tariffs influence consumer behaviour through the price raising effect, effective 
protection influences production by pulling resources from non-tradables and sectors 
with low ERPs to sectors with high ERPs. 
 
Effective protection measures allow for the share of value added in final output, tariffs 
on intermediate inputs and tariffs on final output, and thus measures the magnitude of 
implicit taxation of value added (Greenaway and Milner 2003; Anderson 2003). Once 
the coefficients are computed at industry level, the relative magnitudes indicate the 
direction of resource pulls (Balassa 1965; Johnson 1965; Corden 1966; Basevi 1966; 
Greenaway and Milner 1993). Value added for activity j in the absence of a tariff can 
be expressed as 
  ) 1 ( ij j v a p p − =     (2) 
If a tariff tj is levied on the final output of activity j and ti levied on the intermediate 
input used in the activity then value added for activity j after tariffs is 
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'
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In a case where there are many inputs in the production of j ( i = 1,2,…..n), the 



















In the foregoing, Pv is the value added per unit of good j at free trade prices and pv
’ is 
the value added per unit of j at tariff distorted prices, tj  is the nominal tariff levied on 
industry j, aij is the share of final value added of j accounted for by input i and ti is the 
nominal tariff levied on intermediate input i. The aij are the technical coefficients 
derived from the input output table. Non-traded inputs are treated according to the 




















     [ 7 ]  
where amj are the technical coefficients for non-traded inputs. 
 
Equation [6] will be used to compute the effective protection coefficients. The data 
requirements are the aij (technical coefficients from the Input-Output table), ti  
(nominal tariffs on intermediate inputs) and  tj (nominal tariffs on the final product j). 
We use the implicit tariff, revenue as a proportion of import value before tariffs. 
Trade data is obtained from the Kenya Revenue Authority at eight digit SITC level 
and aggregated to three digit level then mapped to the Input-Output (IO) sector level. 
The  ti are computed by weighting the tj by the technical coefficients (details in 
Annexes). The unpublished 1990 IO table is used to compute ERP for the years 1990 
and 1994, and updated to 1997 to compute ERPs for the years 1997 and 2000. The 
coefficients from the table are post-protection technical coefficients, deflated to   -12-
generate the adjusted technical coefficients i n  t e r m s  o f  f r e e  trade (border) prices 
following Balassa et al (1982): 










= aij        
relating the post-protection (aij) and free trade (aij
w) IO coefficients. Tariffs imposed 
on inputs would discourage the production of j (thus reduce output) and therefore 
aij>aij




Transport costs are a natural barrier to trade. Effective rates of protection arising from 
transport costs are analysed relative to a situation where there are no transport costs. 
Several studies (Amjadi and Yeats 1995, Yeats 1994) argue that transport costs are 
more detrimental to African export competitiveness than tariff barriers and account 
for the decline in Africa’s share in world trade. In 1990/91 transport costs accounted 
for 15% of the value of the regions exports (Amjadi and Yeats 1995). In Kenya the ad 
valorem freight rates for some sectors are even higher than those cited by Amjadi and 
Yeats (1995). In the horticulture sector in Kenya for instance, transport costs are cited 
as one of the key challenges to competitiveness. In rose marketing transport to market 
accounts for 69% of total costs translating to Kshs 6.16 per stem; estimating the price 
of a stem at Kshs. 17 in the international market then the transport component 
translates to an ad valorem rate or an implicit tax of 35%.  For coffee, transport costs 
account for 6-7% of value.  
 
Bulk transportation in Kenya is handled between Kenya Railways and private trucks. 
The Railway network operates on a two rates system, up direction from Mombassa to 
the mainland and down direction from the mainland to the port. The up direction rates 
are higher than the down direction rates reflecting the demand pattern determined by 
the Kenyan pattern of trade; there is a higher tonnage of imports to be ferried in the up 
direction than the exports in the down direction.  Furthermore, the competition from 
roads is much stiffer in the down direction, the trucks usually have no tonnage after 
delivering imports and they charge very low rates for downward bound cargo and thus 
drive down the down direction rates even for railway. They are often interested in 
covering their fuel costs since 70% of the down direction traffic is empty trucks.    -13-
 
This pattern of trade is also reflected in the lead times of container clearance at the 
Mombasa port. Table 1 shows that on average it takes 4 days to clear an outward 
bound container both 20ft and 40ft compared to 9-10 days for inward bound 
containers. Further the findings from a recent growth and competitiveness report 
(World Bank 2004) indicate that customs procedures are another source of delay and 
informal payments by freight forwarders are used to accelerate the process. The 
evidence from the report indicates that a “vessel delay surcharge” compounds the 
problems at the port for importers. 
 
Table 1 Clearing of Container Average (No of days) 
OUTWARD CLEARING  INWARD CLEARING 
 
2002 2001  2002  2001 
COST ($) 
20 ft   4  7  10  18  1174 
40 ft  4  8  9  19  2112 
Source:  World Bank/KIPPRA RPED Survey, 2003 
 
 
The rail line has two corridors to Uganda, the southern corridor through Kisumu and 
the Northern corridor through Malaba. The southern corridor is a more efficient route 
because of the Wagon ferry service over Lake Victoria, through this corridor it is 
possible to transfer wagons from rail to ferry. However, the axle limit to 36 metric 
tonnes along the Nakuru—Kisumu route constrains the potential of a profitable route.  
The northern corridor Mombasa- Malaba- Kampala which has a higher axle load limit 
poses specific challenges; the rates within Uganda, Malaba –Kampala are very high to 
the extent they deter potential users of the line. Indeed some transporters use the line 
to Malaba and then switch to trucks which again reduce efficiency through 
transhipment and double handling.  
 
In determining the transport tariffs other transporters use the rail rates as a benchmark 
for transporting cargo in the upward direction. Though the railway system has a 
higher capacity, the major disadvantage is inefficiency in transit times due to lack of 
door to door delivery. Since the major industries do not have warehouses along the 
railway line, the option entails transhipment and double handling—from wagons to 
trucks and from trucks to warehouse, this increases costs lead time in delivery. 
   -14-
Between 1990 and 1996-2000 the tonnage moved by Kenya railways declined 3.1 
Million metric tonnes to 1.6 metric tonnes. Approximately 30% of the cargo handled 
at the Mombassa port is carried via the railway network, in the year 2002/03 for 
instance Kenya Railways ferried 2.3 million tonnes of cargo. After a period of low 
tonnage, the railway system is regaining its position as a key transporter following the 
implementation of axle load limits for trucks, the high capacity of the rail then makes 
it a more efficient option. 
 
In the case of transport costs, the effective rate of protection is the percentage change 
in value added per unit as a result of freight costs relative to the situation in the 
absence of such costs. Equation [7] is modified as: 















η         [ 8 ]  
Where d j  and  di be the ad valorem freight rates borne on output j and input i 
respectively and aij is as defined in [1].  
 
Domestic transport costs explicitly tax domestic producers. Transport cost on final 
output and inputs jointly compound the magnitude of taxation. To estimate the 
effective implicit taxation model [8] will be adjusted to take into account the 















η        [ 9 ]  
 
The international freight rates dj and di are computed using data from the Kenya 
Revenue Authority (KRA). The data is obtained at 8 digit level SITC; entries where 
freight data are not available are dropped and the remaining entries are aggregated to 
the three digit level and the ad valorem freight rate computed as the difference 
between the cif and fob value divided by the cif value. 







=        [ 1 0 ]  
where cj and fj are the cif and fob values for industry j respectively, di is computed by 
weighting the dj by the deflated technical coefficients. 
 
The internal transport costs are computed based on the scheduled railway tariff for the 
years 1993, 2001 ad 2003. The Kenya Railways schedule gives the rate per tonne per 
kilometre, the total transport charges therefore depend on the distance hauled. To 
estimate the ad valorem transport rate export unit prices are obtained from the 
customs data set, the unit prices are used to estimate the ton value for each 
commodity. The transport cost per ton is divided by the ton value and multiplied by 
the distance. In the absence of accurate distance covered for each commodity we use 
the distance between Nairobi and Mombasa as an average, the estimates are thus 
conservative. 
 
4  ESTIMATES AND RESULTS 
The results by sector are presented in Table 2, from which industries are classified 
into four clusters: industries that have been disprotected throughout, industries that 
have enjoyed positive protection before and after liberalisation; industries that were 
protected but are now disprotected (the losers), and industries that were disprotected 
before liberalisation but now enjoy protection (the gainers). Two estimates are 
provided for 1997/2000, and one is neither consistently higher nor lower than the 
other – only were both agree broadly can be make a firm inference. 
 
The first category includes petroleum based industries, manufacture of metallic 
products and paints & detergents; all have negative values for all estimates. The 
disprotection is generally high and indicates that inputs are more protected than these 
final products. Beverages and tobacco had by far the most negative figure in 1990/94, 
although this fell significantly and may have turned to small protection by 2000. 
However, the negative rates for beverages and tobacco reflect infinite protection, 
rather than negative protection, as it is   ∑ − ij a 1  that is negative. In this case, the   -16-
cost of inputs, if valued properly at world prices, exceeds the value of the output. By 
2000 there appears to be some positive value-added. 
 
 
Table 2 Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection, 1990-2000
a 
Sector 1990-1994 1997-2000 1990-1994 1997-2000 1997-
2000
b
7 Mfg . Bev & Tobacco 0.43 0.15 -18.53 -3.26 0.19
19 Mfg . Met prod's & mach 0.10 0.11 -0.52 -0.38 -0.39
 17Mfg . Other chemicals     0.14 0.05 0.29 -0.23 -0.10
16 Mfg . Paint Det & soap 0.08 0.06 -0.08 -0.15 -0.11
14 Mfg . Petroleum prod's 0.79 0.14 -1.42 -0.13 -0.14
1 Traditional economy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 Mfg . Raw Textiles 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.07
3 Fishing and Forestry 0.17 0.07 0.15 0.06 0.07
13 Mfg . Paper print & publ 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.08
4 Mining and Quarrying 0.09 0.11 -0.15 0.16 0.18
2 Agriculture 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.20 0.19
18 Mfg . Non Metal min prod's 0.13 0.12 -0.61 0.21 0.15
9 Mfg . Finished Textiles 0.27 0.15 0.39 0.25 2.40
15 Mfg . Rubber prod's 0.20 0.15 0.27 0.31 0.26
5 Mfg . Food prep's 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.42 0.28
12 Mfg . Wood prod's  0.24 0.19 0.14 0.50 0.32
11 mfg . Leather & Footwear 0.22 0.23 0.88 0.97 0.65
6 Mfg . Bakery prod's 0.37 0.20 5.93 1.45 -0.09
10 Mfg . Clothing 0.13 0.36 0.12 1.77 1.44
AVE 0.20 0.13 -0.68 0.12 0.29
Average NRP Average ERP
 
Notes: Estimates based on the 1990 Input-Output Table. 
a   given the variation across individual years (Appendix Table A3), figures report average 
for 1990 and 1994 and for 1997 and 2000.  




In the second category are agriculture, fishing and forestry, paper, raw and finished 
textiles, leather and footwear, wood products and rubber industries. In this group of 
industries the general trend is a marginal increase in the level of effective protection. 
Manufacture of bakery products also appears in this category, with very high rates of 
protection, although may have faced negative protection in 2000 (suggesting 
protection on sugar and cereals).   -17-
 
The industries that have gained from liberalisation (from negative to positive rates of 
protection) are non-metallic mineral industries and mining and quarrying. Sectors in 
which protection increased could also be considered as having gained; this is 
unambiguously so for agriculture, manufactured foods, wood products and clothing. 
Protection in some other sectors may have risen, but the two estimates for 1997/2000 
differ. Only one sector, other chemicals, experienced a strict loss in the sense of 
moving from positive to negative protection, although two sectors experienced 
declines in protection (raw textiles, fishing and forestry) according to both 1997/2000 
estimates. 
 
Effective rates of protection give a broad indication of the direction of resource pulls 
within the economy. It would be expected that within the tradeable goods sector there 
would be a shift in resources towards manufacture of bakery products and clothing 
and textiles industries which enjoy the highest levels of protection. 
 
 
The Impact of EAC Customs Union 
The EAC customs union became effective in 2005, when the three members adopted a 
common external tariff rate of: 0% for raw materials, 10% for semi-finished goods 
and a maximum tariff of 25% for all finished products. As the tariff bands in Kenya 
were higher than the CET rates, implementation of the protocol should reduce the 
tariff barriers. 
 
The simulations are based on the model above but, instead of using the actual tariff as 
computed above, tj is the scheduled CET of 25% while ti takes the value of 0% and 
10%. As the data do not permit identification of specific inputs for each sector, i.e. the 
proportion of inputs attracting the 0% or 10% rates, two sets of estimates are provided 
each applying one of the rates on all inputs. The results are compared with the pre-
CET scheduled top rate of 35% (Table 3). 
 
 
   -18-
Table 3 EAC Customs Union Simulations  
  NRP ERP 




                
1  Traditional  economy  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0 
2  Agriculture  35.00  25.00 0.36 0.26 0.10 
3 Fishing and Forestry  35.00  25.00  0.36  0.25  0.10 
4 Mining and Quarrying  35.00  25.00  0.58  0.41  0.16 
5 Mfg . Food prep's  35.00  25.00  0.96  0.69  0.27 
6 Mfg . Bakery prod's  35.00  25.00  0.70  0.50  0.20 
7 Mfg . Bev & Tobacco  35.00  25.00  -6.11  -4.36  -1.75 
8 Mfg . Raw Textiles  35.00  25.00  0.44  0.31  0.13 
9 Mfg . Finished Textiles  35.00  25.00  0.49  0.35  0.14 
10 Mfg . Clothing  35.00  25.00  1.16  0.83  0.33 
11 mfg . Leather & Footwear  35.00  25.00  0.65  0.46  0.19 
12 Mfg . Wood prod's   35.00  25.00  0.66  0.47  0.19 
13 Mfg . Paper print & publ  35.00  25.00  0.55  0.40  0.16 
14 Mfg . Petroleum prod's  35.00  25.00  -0.16  -0.11  -0.05 
15 Mfg . Rubber prod's  35.00  25.00  0.64  0.46  0.182 
16 Mfg . Paint Det & soap  35.00  25.00  0.50  0.36  0.14 
 17Mfg . Other chemicals      35.00  25.00  0.97  0.69  0.28 
18 Mfg . Non Metal min prod's  35.00  25.00  0.66  0.47  0.19 
19 Mfg . Met prod's & mach  35.00  25.00  -1.17  -0.84  -0.33 
AVE    33.16  23.68 0.12 0.08 0.03 
 
 
The results indicate that the protective barriers will gradually decline from an average 
of 12% to about 3% when the EAC protocol becomes effective. This compares 
favourably with an average of 16% for the year 2000, based on the actual tariff. The 
other interesting observation is that the ERP computed from the scheduled tariff is 
12% while using the actual tariff the ERP is 16% showing that using the scheduled 
tariff understates the ERP, in this case by four percentage points. 
 
International Freight 
Implicit protection of domestic producers arising from international freight rates 
reflects an overall reduction in effective rates of protection. Compared to a high 700% 
for bakery products in 1990, the highest in 2000 was 29% for clothing and textile 
industries and forestry and fishing. The results are presented in Table 4.   -19-
 
Table 4. Protection Arising From International Freight Transport Costs  
Sector 1990-94 1997-2000 1990-94 1997-2000
1 Traditional economy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 Agriculture 0.24 0.11 0.24 0.11
3 Fishing and Forestry 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.24
4 Mining and Quarrying 0.30 0.19 0.56 0.48
5 Mfg . Food prep's 0.17 0.10 0.12 0.19
6 Mfg . Bakery prod's 0.31 0.08 3.62 0.08
7 Mfg . Bev & Tobacco 0.16 0.16 -2.21 0.31
8 Mfg . Raw Textiles 0.17 0.13 0.20 0.65
9 Mfg . Finished Textiles 0.18 0.07 -0.07 0.48
10 Mfg . Clothing 0.19 0.17 0.52 0.75
11 mfg . Leather & Footwear 0.29 0.10 0.99 0.17
12 Mfg . Wood prod's  0.19 0.11 0.23 0.17
13 Mfg . Paper print & publ 0.20 0.10 0.28 0.15
14 Mfg . Petroleum prod's 0.19 0.05 0.14 0.12
15 Mfg . Rubber prod's 0.25 0.08 0.40 0.14
16 Mfg . Paint Det & soap 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.05
 17Mfg . Other chemicals     0.21 0.11 0.36 0.22
18 Mfg . Non Metal min prod's 0.53 0.11 1.09 0.21
19 Mfg . Met prod's & mach 0.43 0.10 -1.36 -0.34




The results are presented as two year averages to smooth the data, 1990 and 1994 and 
1997 and 2000. The results reflect an overall decline in the ad valorem transport costs 
from 23% when liberalisation started in early 1990s to 11% by the year 2000. 
However, the protection of value added remains high reflecting a seven percentage 
point decline from 29% to 22% during the period. This shows that although policy 
induced barriers (tariffs) have reduced the level of protection, natural protection via 
transport costs remain high. The implication is that intra-regional trade or ‘south 
south’ trade where transport costs are not prohibitive holds high potential.  On the 
other hand if Kenya has to diversify to north-south trade, international freight rates 
have to be reduced significantly.   
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The average nominal rate of implicit taxation due to transport costs in the early 1990s 
was 14%, very close to the rates cited by Collier and Gunning (1999). The rates have 
declined significantly to about 7% in 2003, mainly due to liberalisation and 
competition (Table 5). However when the technology of production is taken into 
account for transport cost on inputs, the effective taxation remains high. 
 
Table 5. Implicit Taxation from Domestic Transport Costs 
Sector 1993 2001 2003 1993 2001 2003
1 Traditional economy -            -              -           
2 Agriculture 0.18               0.13          0.09          0.21          0.15             0.10         
3 Fishing and Forestry 0.01               0.01          0.01          0.02          0.01             0.01         
4 Mining and Quarrying 0.62               0.46          0.29          0.94          0.72             0.45         
5 Mfg . Food prep's 0.07               0.05          0.03          0.78          0.52             0.33         
7 Mfg . Bev & Tobacco 0.14               0.10          0.06          0.86          0.32             0.21         
8 Mfg . Raw Textiles 0.06               0.04          0.03          0.14          0.17             0.11         
9 Mfg . Finished Textiles 0.06               0.04          0.03          0.13          0.15             0.10         
10 Mfg . Clothing 0.19               0.14          0.09          0.43          0.30             0.19         
11 mfg . Leather & Footwear 0.01               0.01          0.01          0.31          0.19             0.12         
13 Mfg . Paper print & publ 0.14               0.11          0.07          0.45          0.32             0.21         
14 Mfg . Petroleum prod's 0.03               0.02          0.01          1.47          1.02             0.65         
15 Mfg . Rubber prod's 0.07               0.05          0.03          0.28          0.19             0.12         
16 Mfg . Paint Det & soap 0.23               0.17          0.11          0.87          0.59             0.38         
 17Mfg . Other chemicals     0.11               0.08          0.05          0.58          0.36             0.23         
18 Mfg . Non Metal min prod's 0.06          0.03             0.02         
19 Mfg . Met prod's & mach 0.18               0.13          0.09          0.83          0.23             0.15         




From an average of 49% in 1993 the effective implicit taxation declined to 31% in 
2001 and to 20% by 2003. Again it is important to pint out that the rates are computed 
based on the railway scheduled tariff and based on a Nairobi Mombasa distance so the 
rates are based on a conservative estimate and could be even higher than computed in 
this study. The high rates of taxation coupled with other domestic transaction costs 
reduce the competitiveness of Kenyan exports. 
 
5  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The influence of trade policy on growth performance introduces a paradox in the 
structure of protection for an economy in the process of development. On the one 
hand there was a perceived need to protect infant industries — perceived as a road   -21-
map to industrialisation through high tariffs and non-tariff barriers, while generating 
the much needed revenue for the government. On the other hand the price raising 
effect even for intermediate inputs and the distortions created by the protective 
barriers increase inefficiency in the domestic market particularly in manufacturing 
and agriculture, reducing their competitive potential and the growth prospects 
envisaged. This paradox is clearly reflected in the effective structure of protection in 
Kenya. 
 
Ideally trade liberalisation is intended to increase the price of exportables relative to 
importables to switch production in favour of exports away from import competing 
goods. The price incentive is also intended to constrain domestic demand to increase 
the scope for exports. However the outcomes from policy changes are at best 
unpredictable particularly given the other policy changes which may lead to 
conflicting signals, the most import one in this case being the exchange rate policy 
which might inadvertently reverse the trade policy intent.  
 
International freight costs form a natural barrier to trade; assuming the costs computed 
in this study are borne by the neighbouring countries in the same magnitude, then the 
neighbouring countries form a captive market for the country that emerges as a 
competitive producer, even when tariff barriers are removed under WTO or Economic 
Partnership Agreements. Indeed, as the more industrial country in the EAC block, 
Kenya should seek to increase efficiency in production to ensure she retains the 
captive market. However high internal transport costs threaten the competitiveness of 
Kenyan producers; improving the road and railway network, and reforms in Kenya 
Railways, are some of the measures that are necessary to give Kenya a competitive 
edge. Increasing export cargo at Mombasa port to even out inward bound and outward 
bound cargo would also reduce inefficiency and lead times at the port. 
 
From the analysis above, it is evident that though nominal tariffs have been 
significantly reduced, the structure of protection for some sectors is still negative. 
Though the magnitude may vary depending on the methodology and approach, the 
results nevertheless point to the intricacies in the structure of protection, where the 
outcomes depend not just on the nominal tariffs but also on the production 
technology.   -22-
 
The estimation of the true structure of protection poses a number of challenges. First, 
trade policy is not the responsibility of a single ministry or agency. In Kenya the 
policies cut across the Ministries of Finance, Trade/ Commerce and Industries 
(depending on the period in question) and sometimes even the Agriculture Ministry. 
Tracing and quantifying the impact of trade policy across all the agencies then 
becomes a difficult task. The second challenge is that new measures are introduced in 
an ad hoc manner during crises and remain in place even after the crisis is over. 
Kenya’s export and import policy displays a complex mix of import substitution and 
export promotion (Appendix 2). Furthermore the price incentive in the tariff structure 
dictates that consumers switch to the consumption of non-tradables despite the policy 
intent. Clearly, isolating the net impact of trade policy is not a straightforward 
exercise. Indeed the analysis overlooks the rent seeking activity associated with 
protection. 
 
The third challenge is in the underlying assumptions that IO coefficients are fixed, 
that the elasticities of demand for exports and the supply of imports are infinite, that 
all tradable goods remain traded even after tariffs are levied, that fiscal and monetary 
policies maintain internal balance and finally the exclusion of non-traded inputs in the 
production of final goods. Despite these weaknesses and challenges, EPC continue to 
be widely used as it gives policy makers insights into the direction of resource pulls 
without the complex simulations. The findings from this study thus give a general 
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Appendix 1 Effective Protection Rates in Kenya: Additional Estimates 
 
Table A1. Manufacturing Survey Approach 
 
Industry  NRP (%)   ERP (1968) % 
(Phelps & Wasow) 
ERP (1985) % 
 World Bank  
NRP (1988) % 
Maxwell Stamp 
Misc foods  77  119  111  -21 
Milling 46  69     
Canning 17  27     
Soft drinks  10  -11     
Textiles 66  81    50 
Beverages & Tobacco      38   
Garments 43  31  126   
Knitwear 45  72     
Sawmilling, timber  1  -1     
Paper products  36  74  6  -23 
Furniture & Fixtures  19  27     
Pharmaceuticals 15  23  129   
Chemicals 0  -3  211   
Misc Chemicals  17  30     
Paint 44  95     
Cement 0  -10  248   
Glass Products  18  29     
Metal products  10  16     
Iron & Steel      312  12 
Elec Equipment      312   
Leather & footwear      80  47 
Motor Vehicles        262 




                                                 
1 Excluding food beverages and tobacco   -26-

































                                                 
2 D&B refers to Damus and Beaulieu (1989) while K & W refers to Keyfitz and Wanjala (1991) 
Effective Protection Rates for Kenya
D & G K & W
1976 1981 1986 1986
Traditional Economy -1.5 -3.3 -2.3 -2.3
Agriculture 3.2 2.4 1.7 13
Forestry and Fishing 13 25.5 10.2 12.6
Mining and Quarrying 59.1 -23.8 -34.2 64
Mfg. Food Processing 79.4 71.7 665 527.9
Mfg. Bakery Products 62.1 687 65.5 67.9
Mfg. Bev. & Tobacco 222 319 555 855.5
Mfg. Raw Textiles 65.5 62.3 118 141.7
Mfg. Finished textiles 96.8 136 70.3 83.4
Mfg. Clothing 102.1 -0.2 16.5 22.1
Mfg. Leather 200 103 74.9 90.7
Mfg. Wood Products 30.2 133 27.4 68.7
Mfg.Paper Products 22.7 17 29.7 38.8
Mfg. Petroleum -46.3 16.3 -159 44.4
Mfg. Rubber products 18.3 49.1 41.8 51.6
Mfg. Paint Detergents 78.7 189 121 162.4
Mfg. Other Chemicals 9.7 38.1 3.9 15
Mfg. Non Metals 43.4 431 -12.1 120.8
Mfg. Metallic Products 17.9 25.1 19.9 32.9
Repair of Transport Equipmen 57.9 32.8 4.3 14.1
Electricity -5.8 -9.7 -22.8 -9.9
Water -2.9 -6.4 -10.7 -5.5
construction -17.4 -22.6 -28.9 -18.2
Trade -1.2 -3.1 -5.6 -3
Transportation -10 -10.3 -23.7 -11.4
 Communications -7.2 -5.8 -6 -5.8
Restraustrants & Hotels -25.5 -27.1 -32.6 -31.3
O w n e r s h i p  o f  D w e l l i n g s 0000
Financial Services  -0.6 -1.5 -1.9 -1.2
Non Govt Services -6 10.5 240 -6.4
Govt Public Admin -2.8 -6.2 -11.5 -6.5
Govt Education -1.5 -2.5 -4 -1.6
ovt Health -3.2 -6.5 -8.2 -7.6
Govt Agricultrure -5.1 -9.2 -19.1 -7.6
Govt Other -2.9 -6.6 -10.2 -8.8
mean 65.72
Std. Deviation 167.99  -27-
Table A3 Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection 
 
NRP ERP 1997_table
Sector 1990 1994 1997 2000 1990 1994 1997 2000 1997
b 2000
b
1 Traditional economy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 Agriculture 0.05 0.03       0.18 0.19 0.04 0.02 0.19 0.20 0.19          0.20         
3 Fishing and Forestry 0.32 0.02       0.06 0.07 0.32 -0.02 0.06 0.07 0.06          0.07         
4 Mining and Quarrying 0.06 0.11       0.11 0.10 -0.19 -0.11 0.16 0.16 0.18          0.17         
5 Mfg . Food prep's 0.05 0.16       0.13 0.17 -0.43 0.50 0.23 0.60 0.16          0.40         
6 Mfg . Bakery prod's 0.59 0.15       0.19 0.21 11.87 -0.01 1.65 1.26 0.11 -         0.07 -        
7 Mfg . Bev & Tobacco 0.65 0.20       0.15 0.15 -36.44 -0.62 -3.83 -2.70 0.21          0.17         
8 Mfg . Raw Textiles 0.13 0.15       0.05 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.02 0.07 0.05 -         0.18         
9 Mfg . Finished Textiles 0.27 0.26       0.14 0.15 0.40 0.38 0.25 0.25 2.38          2.41         
10 Mfg . Clothing 0.07 0.20       0.30 0.41 -0.27 0.51 1.44 2.10 1.17          1.70         
11 mfg . Leather & Footwear 0.22 0.23       0.23 0.23 0.97 0.79 1.00 0.94 0.67          0.63         
12 Mfg . Wood prod's  0.28 0.21       0.21 0.18 0.28 0.00 0.55 0.46 0.35          0.29         
13 Mfg . Paper print & publ 0.09 0.02       0.06 0.06 0.07 -0.05 0.09 0.08 0.08          0.08         
14 Mfg . Petroleum prod's 0.69 0.89       0.16 0.13 -1.20 -1.64 -0.15 -0.11 0.17 -         0.12 -        
15 Mfg . Rubber prod's 0.19 0.21       0.15 0.15 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.26          0.26         
16 Mfg . Paint Det & soap 0.11 0.06       0.06 0.05 0.14 -0.29 -0.08 -0.21 0.05 -         0.16 -        
 17Mfg . Other chemicals     0.18 0.11       0.05 0.05 0.58 -0.01 -0.21 -0.25 0.08 -         0.11 -        
18 Mfg . Non Metal min prod's 0.23 0.03       0.13 0.11 -0.13 -1.08 0.22 0.21 0.15          0.15         
19 Mfg . Met prod's & mach 0.15 0.06       0.12 0.10 -0.63 -0.41 -0.40 -0.35 0.42 -         0.36 -        
AVE 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.14 -1.28 -0.08 0.08 0.16 0.26 0.31  
1997b and 2000b Rates are computed from a 1997 input output table updated by the 
author from the 1990 Table.  
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Appendix 2 Chronology of Trade Policy Episodes 
 
Period Imports  Exports 
1963-1970 
High growth rates 
  Customs agreement between 
Uganda Tanzania and Kenya 
with a common tariff and the 
use of quantitive restrictions. 
Exchange controls on sterling 
transactions . exchange 
controls become a 
responsibility of CBK 
Measures to eliminate the 





A 398% increase in the 
price of oil --extreme loss 
of foreign reserves.   
Import bans, quotas  and 
licenses introduced. Exchange 
control approvals required—
369 items under restriction, 
150 items banned 147 items 
on quota. 
Imports over Kshs 2000 





Contain the growth of imports 
to 25 on annual basis and. 
Import demand to be curbed 
through quantitive restrictions 
and high taxes. Import 
substitution strategy –as 
measure to contain import 




Increase the growth of exports by 
8% per annum 
Export growth encouraged through 
an export subsidy of 10 % on 
manufactured goods with at least 
30% value added. 
Marketing boards formed for 
marketing of all exports of coffee, 
tea, cotton and horticulture. 
1980 –1985 
 
SAL by world Bank aims: 
Reduced protection, 
devaluation &market lib. 
•  Replace quantitive 
restrictions with tariffs. 
•  Forex allocation 
committee & Import 
export licensing office to 
Eliminate the IS bias against exports. 
Export promotion measures: 
•  Export credit and guarantee 
scheme 
•  Simplify export compensation   -29-
Export insurance scheme  administer controls   
•  Imports of finished goods 
deleted from GPCO 
•  Import Management 
committee (IMC) formed 
Transparency through 
publication of 3 import 
schedules (I IIA & IIB) 
scheme for approved categories 
of exports 
•  Export compensation raised to 
20% 
 
1986 – 1990 
Import Substitution 
 
Processing charge for import 
application increased from 1% 
to 1.5% (value +freight) 
 




Removal of forex controls 
replacement of QRs by tariffs 
and tariff rationalisation 
•  COMESA free Trade Area 
•  Export Processing Zone bill 
•  MUB VAT zero rated  
1996-2000    Export compensation reduced from 
20% to 18% 
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Annex 5 1990 Trade Data Kshs Million
I-O Sec qty fob cif cust_val duty salestax tariff 1 tariff2 tariff 3 tariff 4
2                611.0             648               1,350           4,590         73                  2                          5% 5% 2% 2%
3                10.3               0                   1                  442            0                    0                          48% 32% 0% 0%
4                511.0             300               403              1,220         27                  15                        7% 6% 2% 2%
5                379.0             1,450            1,800           3,910         100                46                        6% 5% 3% 2%
6                0.4                 0                   0                  11              1                    0                          146% 59% 5% 5%
7                293.0             48                 61                11,100       116                84                        190% 65% 1% 1%
8                32.0               14                 16                424            2                    0                          15% 13% 1% 1%
9                21.7               541               668              1,190         249                62                        37% 27% 21% 17%
10              11.1               160               301              339            23                  10                        8% 7% 7% 6%
11              17.1               38                 56                713            16                  9                          28% 22% 2% 2%
12              159.0             629               722              1,160         274                39                        38% 28% 24% 19%
13              8.2                 471               420              680            40                  21                        9% 9% 6% 5%
14              1,890.0          192               307              7,740         689                3,430                   224% 69% 9% 8%
15              21.5               505               496              530            120                132                      24% 19% 23% 18%
16              27.8               1,560            1,640           2,250         195                41                        12% 11% 9% 8%
17              319.0             3,230            3,690           4,630         804                170                      22% 18% 17% 15%
18              481.0             1,840            2,080           3,170         606                277                      29% 23% 19% 16%
19              409.0             15,100          18,400         28,600       3,130             1,460                   17% 15% 11% 10%
21              0.2                 36                 60                62              6                    3                          10% 9% 10% 9%
Total 26,762          32,471       72,761     6,470           5,800                 
tariff 1 duty/ C.I.F value
tariff 2 duty/ (C.I.F value +duty)
tariff 3 duty/ (customs value )




Annex 6 Computation of 1990 Freight Rates
I-O Sec fob cif qty cust_val duty salestax CIF-FOB Rate1 rate2
2                583                687                   100                 677                     66                2                   104.10           18% 15%
3                0                    0                       0                     0                         0                  0                   0.03               17% 15%
4                286                373                   167                 370                     19                10                 86.90             30% 23%
5                964                1,158                127                 1,146                  94                45                 193.80           20% 17%
6                0                    0                       0                     0                         0                  0                   0.04               89% 47%
7                89                  111                   2                     103                     16                2                   21.76             24% 20%
8                14                  16                     2                     16                       2                  -                2.04               15% 13%
9                719                930                   14                   840                     107              30                 211.50           29% 23%
10              172                204                   5                     147                     9                  3                   31.70             18% 16%
11              34                  55                     2                     38                       11                6                   20.27             59% 37%
12              601                723                   36                   690                     142              20                 122.30           20% 17%
13              353                421                   6                     380                     19                10                 68.50             19% 16%
14              1,713             2,274                1,200              4,828                  16                6                   561.00           33% 25%
15              402                468                   16                   357                     78                110               66.40             17% 14%
16              1,292             1,508                7                     1,386                  111              24                 216.00           17% 14%
17              3,257             3,882                260                 3,817                  587              125               625.00           19% 16%
18              1,595             1,884                60                   1,593                  328              145               289.00           18% 15%
19              14,060           16,440              207                 15,230                1,019           502               2,380.00        17% 14%
21              37                  43                     0                     39                       5                  2                   5.89               16% 14%
Rate 1  (cif-fob)/fob
Rate 2 (cif-fob)/cif
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Annex 7 Trade Distorted Coefficients matrix
Sectors TRADCONAGRIC FOFISH MINE MANFD BAKE BEVS RAWTEX FINTEX CLOTH FTWEAR WOODPROD
1 TRADCON 0.061 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 AGRIC 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.223 0.001 0.011 0.107 0.000 0.005 0.032 0.000
3 FOFISH 0.027 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.047
4 MINE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 MANFD 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.386 0.582 0.269 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.310 0.000
6 BAKE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 BEVS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
8 RAWTEX 0.000 0.006 0.014 0.018 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.107 0.002 0.001 0.008
9 FINTEX 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.290 0.014 0.008
10 CLOTH 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.000
11 FTWEAR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000
12 WOODPROD 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.107
13 PPUB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.042 0.006 0.018 0.007 0.011 0.043 0.058 0.003
14 PTROL 0.000 0.010 0.046 0.260 0.075 0.013 0.117 0.080 0.067 0.060 0.025 0.254
15 RUBBER 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.107 0.008
16 PDSOAP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
17 CHEMCS 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.014 0.031 0.001 0.015 0.017 0.091 0.009 0.074 0.025
18 NONMET 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.081 0.004 0.002 0.024 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.006
19 METALICS 0.026 0.004 0.000 0.039 0.066 0.002 0.042 0.065 0.027 0.086 0.025 0.114
20 REPEQP 0.000 0.001 0.011 0.049 0.014 0.003 0.018 0.010 0.005 0.019 0.004 0.050
21 ELEC 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.003
22 WATER 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000
23 CONSTC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
24 TRADE 0.005 0.013 0.001 0.013 0.041 0.003 0.043 0.022 0.029 0.070 0.030 0.033
25 TRANSP 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.049 0.010 0.000 0.020 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.005
26 COMMUNC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.001 0.003
27 RESTHOT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
28 DWELL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
29 FINSERV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.053 0.036 0.006 0.035 0.062 0.072 0.175 0.011 0.056
30 NONGVTSERV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.005 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.005 0.010 0.018 0.005
31 PADMIN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
32 GOVEDU 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
33 GOVHET 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
34 GOVAGR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
35 GOVOT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
36 OTH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.007 0.014 0.005 0.012 0.009 0.057 0.021 0.015 
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Annex 8 Trade Free (Deflated) Coefficients matrix
Sectors Ad valoremTarTRADCONAGRIC FOFISH MINE MANFD BAKE BEVS RAWTEX FINTEX CLOTH FTWEAR WOODPROD PPUB
1 0.00 0.061 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.05 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.224 0.001 0.018 0.116 0.000 0.006 0.037 0.000 0.000
3 0.32 0.020 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.000
4 0.06 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.05 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.386 0.881 0.423 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.359 0.000 0.000
6 0.59 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.65 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
8 0.13 0.000 0.005 0.016 0.017 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.120 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.001
9 0.27 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.245 0.013 0.008 0.001
10 0.07 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000
11 0.22 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.000
12 0.28 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.107 0.000
13 0.09 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.040 0.008 0.028 0.008 0.013 0.042 0.065 0.004 0.416
14 0.69 0.000 0.006 0.036 0.163 0.047 0.013 0.115 0.053 0.050 0.038 0.018 0.191 0.024
15 0.19 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.110 0.008 0.001
16 0.11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
17 0.18 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.013 0.028 0.002 0.021 0.017 0.098 0.008 0.077 0.027 0.030
18 0.23 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.004 0.002 0.033 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.000
19 0.15 0.022 0.004 0.000 0.036 0.061 0.003 0.061 0.064 0.030 0.080 0.026 0.127 0.046
20 0.00 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.052 0.014 0.005 0.029 0.011 0.006 0.020 0.005 0.064 0.010
21 0.10 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.003
22 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
23 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002
24 0.00 0.005 0.014 0.002 0.014 0.043 0.005 0.071 0.025 0.036 0.075 0.037 0.042 0.037
25 0.00 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.052 0.011 0.000 0.032 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.008
26 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.002 0.004 0.015
27 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
28 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
29 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.037 0.009 0.057 0.071 0.092 0.187 0.013 0.071 0.066
30 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.005 0.001 0.013 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.022 0.006 0.013
31 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
32 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
33 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
34 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
35 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
36 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.008 0.023 0.008 0.014 0.011 0.061 0.025 0.019 0.022 
 





Annex 9 Computing 1990 ERP
aijti
Sectors Ad valoremTarTRADCONAGRIC FOFISH MINE MANFD BAKE BEVS RAWTEX FINTEX CLOTH FTWEAR WOODPROD PPUB
10 . 0 0 -            -               -               -                -                -                 -               -               -               -                -               -               -              
20 . 0 5 -            0.001           -               -                0.011            0.000             0.001           0.006           -               0.000            0.002           -               -              
30 . 3 2 0 . 0 0 7        -               0.000           -                0.000            -                 -               -               -               -                -               0.015           -              
40 . 0 6 -            -               -               -                0.000            -                 -               -               -               -                -               -               -              
50 . 0 5 -            0.001           -               -                0.020            0.046             0.022           -               -               -                0.019           -               -              
60 . 5 9 -            -               -               -                0.000            -                 -               -               -               -                -               -               -              
70 . 6 5 -            -               -               -                -                -                 0.041           -               -               -                -               -               -              
80 . 1 3 -            0.001           0.002           0.002            0.001            -                 -               0.006           0.016           0.000            0.000           0.001           0.000          
90 . 2 7 -            -               -               -                -                -                 -               -               0.014           0.066            0.004           0.002           0.000          
10 0.07 -            0.000           -               -                0.000            -                 -               -               -               0.003            -               -               -              
11 0.22 -            -               -               -                0.000            -                 -               -               -               -                0.011           -               -              
12 0.28 0.004        -               -               0.000            0.000            -                 0.001           -               -               -                -               0.030           0.000          
13 0.09 -            0.000           -               0.001            0.003            0.001             0.002           0.001           0.001           0.004            0.006           0.000           0.036          
14 0.69 -            0.004           0.025           0.113            0.032            0.009             0.079           0.037           0.035           0.026            0.012           0.132           0.017          
15 0.19 -            0.000           0.000           0.001            0.000            0.000             0.001           -               -               0.000            0.021           0.002           0.000          
16 0.11 -            -               -               -                0.000            -                 -               -               -               -                -               0.000           -              
17 0.18 -            0.005           -               0.002            0.005            0.000             0.004           0.003           0.017           0.001            0.014           0.005           0.005          
18 0.23 0.012        -               -               0.016            0.001            0.000             0.007           0.001           0.000           0.000            -               0.001           0.000          
19 0.15 0.003        0.001           -               0.005            0.009            0.000             0.009           0.009           0.004           0.012            0.004           0.018           0.007          
tj - sum(aijti) 0.04             0.30             0.08 -             0.03 -             0.54               0.49             0.07             0.18             0.04 -             0.13             0.07             0.02            
1- sum(aij)-sum(mj) 0.895 0.929 0.414 0.074 0.045 -0.013 0.557 0.456 0.162 0.132 0.245 0.303
Ej 0.04             0.32             0.19 -             0.43 -             11.87             36.44 -          0.13             0.40             0.27 -             0.97             0.28             0.07                      